Michael Kleber

We're very willing to explore the possibilities for "a trusted entity outside of the browser" as part of the Privacy Sandbox. And indeed for the [Chrome proposal for an Aggregate...

Yes, there are definitely a wide range of trusted-server approaches (the four above and surely others too) that we should explore. But of course browsers will be more skeptical of...

Yup, these are two good questions. > What kinds of security guarantees would you need to see from a trusted entity before Chrome considers them trustworthy? This is about what...

Hi Lukasz, I don't quite understand what you're proposing here. For a single FLoC cohort, per the data [here](https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-privacy/privacy-sandbox/floc), there are hundreds of different browsing histories that lead to being...

Hi Artur, > The main thing I can think of is to reduce the length of the FLoC so collisions are frequent enough to make it difficult to make inferences...

Quite right — though note that this will be partly mitigated by the removal of 3rd-party cookies, of course!

@PanMat Yup, there has been a bunch of discussion of this in #45. We would definitely like to use a clustering technique that got more information from large heterogeneous sites,...

Hi Bennett, thanks for writing this out, it's an interesting question. We posted some details of the locality-sensitive hash we're using in the first Origin Trial here: https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-privacy/privacy-sandbox/floc. A couple...

@millengustavo What did you to do get a `"chrome.1.1"` flock version string? Is this based on starting up your own browser with some specialized set of command-line flags? I don't...

There are some plausible ways of building flocks that start with page taxonomies, as you suggest. It seems like it would require on-device ML to figure out the taxonomy of...