obadiaa

Ty @thegostep this is what I meant to describe above! Q for you: what if a builder sends their header to multiple relays?

On Q3 `Is a griefing vector from proposers acceptable?`: I'd like to understand the griefing attack better. In broad terms, the attack would be the proposer securing the money from...

Hey @fradamt @thegostep @terencechain, thanks for your replies! I'll address each individually. @fradamt: > With this other scheme, a relay can withhold a payment just the same, but they are...

@terencechain : great point! however in my mind the builder had access to the block gossip layer, why do you assume they don't? if they did, i imagine a participating...

@thegostep : > Something which has been brought up in the past is that relays should gossip builder payloads amongst each other to improve data availability. This seems dangerous to...

Hey! Thank you all for your comments and the several conversations on and offline on this topic. My conclusion on this issue is the following: 'unconditional payments' is unlikely to...

Hey everyone! Thanks a lot for you comments here, and thanks in particular to @casparschwa and @fradamt for the conversations offline and the detailed answers above. They've been critical in...

#28 My bad for the duplication, the issue is in #28 and as suggested by Phil! Comment from @gakonst: Phil's proposals give a mathematical way to express the total MEV,...

this tx 0x83dd147043e1ceec0e51adc4be46db68e9351cce71103236d8bb7c72713e76b7 classified as a MEV profit of $954,665.13 shows up as a reverted tx on Etherscan: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x83dd147043e1ceec0e51adc4be46db68e9351cce71103236d8bb7c72713e76b7

0x8837130fe51f7ef3b27955bca9f6074a4785ebff8fc919ea8883ea5e05592123 this one's revenue feels suspicious, it's a volume of ~$3m and recorded a revenue of ~$3m, seems unlikely or a hack These are all DRC transactions that seem like...