Stefan Berger

To avoid registering bogus key IDs in the central server, one could use the static account info to contact the final server.

If we were to use OpenPGP for managing friends' public keys, then would we also want to use it for the layer encryption directly and take its encrypted output as...

> If not, it would be possible to modify one of the intermediate layers in order to gain backdoor access to the plaintext. How would that be possible? We are...

> How you encrypt the individual layer is irrelevant for this attack since the attack works by modifying one of the unencrypted layers. How do you get to decrypt the...

The integrity of the whole can be verified with (previous) Notary or whatever may be in use these days -- we didn't want to re-invent this part. We do NOT...

> An alternate implementation would include the measurements of each dependent layer inside the AEAD of the encrypted layer. Would it have to be each dependent layer or if it...

The swtpm tests pass when ASAN is not enabled but fail when ASAN is enabled since then certain command line tools return ~= 0 exit code. In either case there...

Here's the full log of that test case (without full traceback to the memory leaks). ``` ** (process:781394): WARNING **: 12:58:59.894: Failed to create connection with service: GDBus.Error:org.freedesktop.DBus.Error.NameHasNoOwner: Could not...

> Maybe it’s possible to prevent QEMU from migrating the state file, don’t lock the file and just rely on the (shared)filesystem. QEMU only supports actively migrating the state of...

> Could we have something similar for swtpm? My concern here is the somewhat difficult-to-test case of migration failure and fallback ...