shumy-tools

Hello, I'm the author of the stackexchange question. Erik Aronesty, thank you for the invite. I'm trying to find a solid response for the proposal, since I can't believe myself...

@earonesty "it was insecure on multiple levels" - Although I'm still trying to reach to a complete proof of security. With the exception that first attack (which is easily solvable...

@earonesty By R you meen m*G = R ? This is dicussed in the other topic. You can't sign a message without having m, and you can't have m without...

How, can you give me a math proof on that? Because the math formulation that I have done doesn't allow to recover m without knowing m0. Even if k-sum on...

"Which implies you already have m" - There is where you assumption fails. Having a public key does not imply to have the private key, or else every asymmetric encryption...

In a conclusion, controling the R value is a false assumption. It's pointless to control R if you cannot output a signature with it! Because, to output the signature require...

The answer already assumes that the k-sum is not a problem "This shouldn't an issue for signatures", due to exactly of what I explained. The second attack, is also not...

A curiosity... if a bilinear pairing can perform a second degree verification, and if you can perform a threshold signature with BLS in one round; then (by intuition), you should...

I didn't know about the A operator, but I don't believe it's a good solution because it doesn't allow for arbitrary code execution and for custom ASTs. After analyzing the...

> It's possible, but I'm concerned that it could get complicated quickly. Yes, probably. Besides that I like the @fjf2002 solution. But I believe you should be explicit about the...