István András Seres

Even though this does not solve the initial _O(n)_ scanning overhead (_n_ is the number of all Umbra stealth transactions) of recipient for the very first transaction, this would be...

Would not be that broken privacy-wise? I suppose here that everyone knows the public keys corresponding to an address. This certainly holds whenever funds are redeemed, since it is possible...

Hey! yeah, it was scraped from the 1ml website! If you download our used data, you can see there the 1ml metadata in the `1ml_meta_data.csv` file! Hope, this helps! p.s....

Hey! The data used in our work was kindly provided by Antoine Le Calvez (@khannib on Twitter), a data scientist and engineer at CoinMetrics. He had a list of all...

> please add > > * [ ] anonset per round [quantity of equal value outputs at different pools] at least this? pls pls pls...because then we can also easily...

Thanks for the clarification, Micah! Although this does not hold anymore, if the group is pairing-friendly. In that case one could easily deduct whether two derived child public keys belong...

You're certainly right, although this simple trick would allow one to nullify the privacy benefits of zkSNARKs by allowing them to link t- and/or z-addresses, if they were generated using...

Sean Bowe (@ebfull) has just clarified to me that "the curve we use for keying material in zcash is not pairing-friendly"

> I think this isn't what we are looking for. What we are looking for is every normal looking blockchain transaction that doesn't have anything to do with coinjoins. And...

> * I realized we need to collect post mix transactions, too, because Core isn't able to walk the chain forward. I think immediate post mix transactions should be sufficient,...