Chenxing Li

I guess this is because the current `estimate_confirmation_risk` skims a check: "where such block has been followed by all the honest nodes". Besides, even if we have a correct implementation...

The gas used in a transaction can not exceed the maximum gas allowed in one block, which is must less than 2^256

> BTW, "charge_all" actually means to charge_75_percent in the code. Yes, we will refund at most 1/4 * tx.gas.

> 3*gas_left may overflow in theory. But unlikely since nobody has too much CFX. It is not because of the transanction fee, because the gas_price cound equal to 0. But...

> I raise this issue mainly to ask if we have a way to find out all potential overflow. If an overflow happens for struct `U256` and `U512`, the basic...

I have discussed it with zhe offline before. So I assign zhe for remark. The logic is in function `process_epoch_transactions()` of `ConsensusExecutionHandler`, after `transact()`. In case the execution outcome is...

If `tx.gas * tx.gas_price > 2^256`, there will always be a "not enough gas fee" error. See the transaction preprocessing in function `transact()`.

> Is this still an issue with the latest stable? Yes, this issue still exists with the most recent rust version 1.64.0 and arkworks version 0.3.0.

Closing due to inactivity. Feel free to comment if you'd like to continue the discussion. Thank you!

Closing due to inactivity. Feel free to comment if you'd like to continue the discussion. Thank you!