Install script does not verify release integrity
The install script calls download_release_from_repo then install_from_file, but it extracts the release without verifying integrity or authenticity. An attacker who can replace a release artifact (or a compromised intermediary/CA) could supply a malicious archive and it would be installed silently.
Please consider adding GPG-signed release artifacts / signatures (or a signed checksum manifest). Just using HTTPS isn't an adequate root of trust against repo compromise, compromised signing accounts, CA compromises, or targeted attacks.
Is this still available, i'd like to work on it
@Muktarsadiq: this one is for sure available, same issue, in a project with much more visibility if you want to work on it:
https://github.com/ollama/ollama/issues/5338
@Muktarsadiq: this one is for sure available, same issue, in a project with much more visibility if you want to work on it:
Awesome, thanks for confirming! I’d like to contribute to both if possible, starting with this one to get familiar, and then moving on to the higher visibility project.
Great, go ahead and submit a PR!