vicsn

Results 78 issues of vicsn

@stevermeister thx for building the nice tool. I'm afraid there might be a mistake in the calculation. Two calls with the Dutch tax authority assured me that the holiday allowance...

### System information Type | Version/Name --- | --- Distribution Name | Debian Distribution Version | Buster Linux Kernel | 5.10.0-0.bpo.4-amd64 / 4.19.0-16 Architecture | amd64 ZFS Version | 2.0.3-1\~bpo10+1...

Type: Defect
Component: Send/Recv
Component: Encryption

## Motivation Closes https://github.com/AleoHQ/snarkOS/issues/2876 ## Open questions - we can consider merging `AddressWithCoordinate` upstream into snarkVM ## Performance In the tradition of Lukasz brilliance, I'm using [Vecs+BinarySearch instead of maps](https://github.com/AleoHQ/snarkVM/pull/2193)....

## 🚀 Feature `is_peer_far_in_future` seems not to do anything, because down the call chain into `update_to_next_round` , we need to see quorum *anyway* and we're only advancing one round at...

feature

## 🚀 Feature In order to enhance the robustness of a validator node, we should by default ensure they only accept connections from trusted clients. Given that we already have...

feature

## Motivation Following EIP-1559 and common decency, this PR ensures we process transactions by priority_fee. If the priority_fee is the same, we order by timestamp (in nanoseconds), and otherwise randomly...

post-launch

## Motivation Our clients can and do run out of memory, probably because they have no limit on how many transactions they verify in parallel. This PR proposes to queue...

post-launch

## This PR may have become unneccesary due to https://github.com/ProvableHQ/snarkOS/pull/3089 ## Motivation It is unfortunate that we can't take speculative execution fees from deployments at the moment, so as a...

post-launch

## 🚀 Feature Currently validators call `Ledger::::check_transaction_basic(...)` twice when receiving executions via the P2P network or RPC endpoint and thrice when receiving deployments. ## Motivation It would be great if...

feature

## 🐛 Bug Report If a malicious leader sends a certificate with a round set far into the future, the receiving nodes will blindly pass that through `try_increment_to_the_next_round(...)`, repeatedly calling...

bug