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toralf
Support ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 Out of the box
Hi,
Any chance you could have the script detect when ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 is in use?
So I don't have to use CONFIGURED_RELAYS.
Thank you,
Will
So, let ipv4-rules.sh and ipv6-rules.sh skip every tor config file if it contains the string ServerTransportListenAddr ?
Not skip.
Detect when it is in use, grab the port, and set up the rules for it just like you do with standard ORPort.
On Ubuntu 24.04:
sudo apt-get install obfs4proxy
sudo setcap cap_net_bind_service=+ep /usr/bin/obfs4proxy
/etc/tor/torrc:
ORPort ServerIP:8080
ServerTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy
ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 ServerIP:8000
So the standard TOR port being port 8080 and using obfs4 on port 8000.
When running with:
sudo CONFIGURED_RELAYS="ServerIP :8080 ServerIP :8000" ./ipv4-rules.sh start
sudo watch -t ./ipv4-rules.sh:
0 0 ACCEPT 0 -- lo * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 /* DDoS IPv4 Sun, 02 Mar 2025 15:25:52 +0000 */
0 0 DROP 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp flags:!0x17/0x02 state NEW
0 0 DROP 0 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 ctstate INVALID
0 0 ACCEPT 0 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:275 flags:0x17/0x02
0 0 ACCEPT 1 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 icmptype 8 limit: avg 6/sec burst 5
0 0 ACCEPT 17 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 udp dpt:68
0 0 ACCEPT 0 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 match-set hetzner-sysmon src
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp flags:0x17/0x02 match-set tor-trust src
0 0 SET 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8080 limit: above 9/min burst 1 mode srcip-dstport htable-expire 120000 add-set tor-ddos-8080 src exist
0 0 DROP 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8080 match-set tor-ddos-8080 src
0 0 DROP 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8080 #conn src/32 > 9
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8080 flags:0x17/0x02
0 0 SET 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8000 limit: above 9/min burst 1 mode srcip-dstport htable-expire 120000 add-set tor-ddos-8000 src exist
0 0 DROP 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8000 match-set tor-ddos-8000 src
0 0 DROP 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8000 #conn src/32 > 9
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8000 flags:0x17/0x02
That's the expected and correct output when using CONFIGURED_RELAYS.
Both ports, 8080 and 8000, are protected.
If I leave off CONFIGURED_RELAYS and just run sudo ./ipv4-rules.sh start I get:
0 0 ACCEPT 0 -- lo * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 /* DDoS IPv4 Mon, 03 Mar 2025 21:03:20 +0000 */
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp flags:!0x17/0x02 state NEW
0 0 ACCEPT 0 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 ctstate INVALID
0 0 ACCEPT 0 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:275 flags:0x17/0x02
0 0 ACCEPT 1 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 icmptype 8 limit: avg 6/sec burst 5
0 0 ACCEPT 17 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 udp dpt:68
0 0 ACCEPT 0 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 match-set hetzner-sysmon src
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp flags:0x17/0x02 match-set tor-trust src
0 0 SET 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8080 limit: above 9/min burst 1 mode srcip-dstport htable-expire 120000 add-set tor-ddos-8080 src exist
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8080 match-set tor-ddos-8080 src
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8080 #conn src/32 > 9
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8080 flags:0x17/0x02
Notice only standard port 8080 is protected.
Hhm, interesting. I never thought about preventing DDoS of a bridge (I used a reduced firewall for non-server relays: https://github.com/toralf/tor-relays/blob/main/playbooks/roles/setup_common/templates/firewall-ipv4.sh.j2) And because my bridges are configured like
BridgeRelay 1
ORPort 127.0.0.1:auto
AssumeReachable 1
ExtORPort auto
ServerTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/lyrebird
ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 0.0.0.0:55832
I haven't thought about that. Ok, will try.
When running with:
sudo CONFIGURED_RELAYS="ServerIP :8080 ServerIP :8000" ./ipv4-rules.sh start
BTW, The spaces before the colon are wrong (copy+paste error I do assume?)
Yes, correct. It's correct when I ran the command. Sorry about that.
Will test the commit this weekend.
Thank you very much.
Looks like it's reversed now:
Mon, 17 Mar 2025 18:12:07 +0000
Chain INPUT (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes)
pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination
1258 212K ts-input 0 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0
100 6500 ACCEPT 0 -- lo * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0
0 0 REJECT 0 -- !lo * 0.0.0.0/0 127.0.0.0/8 reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
641 179K ACCEPT 0 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 state RELATED,ESTABLISHED
83 3320 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:80
261 12688 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:443
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:10000
36 2140 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:8000
2 100 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:8080
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:41641
0 0 ACCEPT 17 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 udp dpt:41641
0 0 ACCEPT 17 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 udp dpt:3478
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:19999
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 state NEW tcp dpt:275
12 788 ACCEPT 1 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 icmptype 8
21 1208 LOG 0 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 limit: avg 5/min burst 5 LOG flags 0 level 7 prefix "iptables denied: "
117 6528 REJECT 0 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
0 0 ACCEPT 0 -- lo * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 /* DDoS IPv4 Mon, 17 Mar 2025 18:10:42 +0000 */
0 0 DROP 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp flags:!0x17/0x02 state NEW
0 0 DROP 0 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 ctstate INVALID
0 0 ACCEPT 0 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:275 flags:0x17/0x02
0 0 ACCEPT 1 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 icmptype 8 limit: avg 6/sec burst 5
0 0 ACCEPT 17 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 udp dpt:68
0 0 ACCEPT 0 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 match-set hetzner-sysmon src
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp flags:0x17/0x02 match-set tor-trust src
0 0 SET 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8000 limit: above 9/min burst 1 mode srcip-dstport htable-expire 120000 add-set tor-ddos-8000 src exist
0 0 DROP 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8000 match-set tor-ddos-8000 src
0 0 DROP 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8000 #conn src/32 > 9
0 0 ACCEPT 6 -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 ServerIP tcp dpt:8000 flags:0x17/0x02
Now missing the standard ORPort rules.
So I need the torrc to understood what happened. Please replace the ServerIP with 1.2.3.4 when attaching the file here.
/* DDoS IPv4 Mon, 17 Mar 2025 18:10:42 +0000 */
And I do not understood the rules above this one. Do you added additional code to the script?
/* DDoS IPv4 Mon, 17 Mar 2025 18:10:42 +0000 */
And I do not understood the rules above this one. Do you added additional code to the script?
Those are my normal iptables rules. Yeah I have to comment out clearRules on Lines 208, 284, 295 so my rules stay put.
So I need the torrc to understood what happened. Please replace the ServerIP with
1.2.3.4when attaching the file here.
Here you go.
## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
## by removing the "#" symbol.
##
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
## for more options you can use in this file.
##
## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
#SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
#SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
#SocksPolicy reject *
## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
#Log notice syslog
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr
## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
RunAsDaemon 1
## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
#DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
ControlPort 9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
HashedControlPassword 16:MyHashOfMyPassword
#CookieAuthentication 1
############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people.
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
################ This section is just for relays #####################
#
## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
ORPort 1.2.3.4:8080
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen
#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5
## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
#Nickname ididnteditheconfig
## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 20 KB.
## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
RelayBandwidthRate 20480 KB # Throttle traffic to 20MB/s
RelayBandwidthBurst 25600 KB # But allow bursts up to 25MB/s
## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
#AccountingMax 4 GB
AccountingMax 25 GB
## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
AccountingStart day 00:00
## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
## is per month)
#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
ContactInfo <friends know how to contact me>
## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
##
## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
##
## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
##
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
#ExitPolicy accept *:53 # DNS
#ExitPolicy accept *:80 # HTTP
#ExitPolicy accept *:443 # HTTPS
ExitPolicy reject *:*
## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
BridgeRelay 1
## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#PublishServerDescriptor 0
#ServerTransportPlugin
ServerTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy
# Replace "TODO" with an obfs4 port of your choice. This port must be externally reachable.
# Avoid port 9001 because it's commonly associated with Tor and censors may be scanning the Internet for this port.
ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 1.2.3.4:8000
# Local communication port between Tor and obfs4. Always set this to "auto".
# "Ext" means "extended", not "external". Don't try to set a specific port number, nor listen on 0.0.0.0.
ExtORPort auto
#Enable IPv6
ORPort IP6Addrss:9001
IPv6Exit 1
Basically:
Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
RunAsDaemon 1
ControlPort 9051
HashedControlPassword 16:MyHashOfMyPassword
ORPort 1.2.3.4:8080
AccountingMax 25 GB
AccountingStart day 00:00
ContactInfo <friends know how to contact me>
ExitPolicy reject *:*
BridgeRelay 1
ServerTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy
ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 1.2.3.4:8000
ExtORPort auto
ORPort IP6Addrss:9001
IPv6Exit 1
You should never run a Bridge at the same address where you configured Tor to be a (visible) relay. Either configure Tor as a bridge, as a non-Exit relay or as an Exit.
The above does not work for an Exit because you missed ExitRelay 1.
But don't do that if you want to run a bridge.
The Torproject forum has a lot of helpful articles about that for you.
Beside that:
IP6Addrss is in [..] format?
I do not see other issue. So I dunno why the current script does not work as expected at your system. Can you try an unmodified version of the ddos script?