tari
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The Tari protocol
Currently, not all bad behaviour is punished in the comms layer: - [x] SAF/Store: the message has no signature - [x] SAF_handler/task: invalid saf message - [ ] SAF_handler/task: peer...
Currently the call `pub unsafe extern "C" fn wallet_get_last_version(config: *mut TariCommsConfig, error_out: *mut c_int) -> *mut c_char` take in the entire `TariCommsConfig`, this is not needed and we can reduce...
We need to ensure that we store the base node tor key in a safe location, currently, the file locked to a user, but its not really safe as its...
**Describe the bug** The smt crate is newly added, going into production soon, and must be fuzzed.
### Summary A peer may send an encrypted domain messages. No routing peer can decipher it, so they are unable to detect that the message is invalid. If this message,...
Protobuf messages can have extra fields in the messages that are not shown by the proto file, This can increase message size up to the frame size and allow peers...
The wallet should be able to ban peers as well.
We determine the number of TCP nodes by looking at the connection address. For inbound connections are currently always TCP regardless of transport. For tor, they always reflect the inbound...
Sync update: `self.hooks.call_on_starting_hook` drains the peer list, so it will only work for the first peer. https://github.com/tari-project/tari/blob/6c8e2d395799757e5a946fe01226f739d0706741/base_layer/core/src/base_node/sync/hooks.rs#L49C11-L49C11
If the node receives an invalid chain metadata it should ban the peer