fix: implement CSRF protection for remote function requests

[PuruVJ]

Closes #14791

As discussed, this makes sure the remote functions respect csrf.trustedOrigins. If trustedOrigins includes *, then any origin is allowed.

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[PuruVJ]

Admission: The tests are LLM written, lemme know if they're complete garbage 🤣😅

[PuruVJ]

Any update? 😁

[Rich-Harris]

We had a lengthy discussion among the maintainers just now and concluded that trustedOrigins is the wrong tool for this job. The problem isn't that we want to expose remote functions to arbitrary callers, it's that your preview deployments don't understand what their own origin is.

Ordinarily, the origin comes from request.url, which is determined by the adapter (but in most cases, ultimately, by the platform — e.g. in the adapter-vercel case we're passed a fully-formed Request object which already has the url set). In the case of adapter-node we don't know the request.url by default, hence the ORIGIN environment variable.

One thing we could do is create a new config option, such as paths.origin:

// svelte.config.js
export default {
  kit: {
    paths: {
      origin: process.env.ORIGIN ?? ''
    }
  }
};

The empty string would mean 'auto', i.e. derive the origin from request.url, but otherwise we could use the configured value.

If I understand correctly, this would satisfy your use case, and it could also replace ORIGIN in adapter-node and the kit.prerender.origin option. All without weakening CSRF guarantees. Does that sound workable?

[PuruVJ]

This would be absolutely fantastic! Thank you

[Trifall]

+1 this would really benefit one of my use cases