sinu.eth

> it should be impossible to attack encryption/decryption circuits because the Follower is "locked" into only using the labels corresponding to his key share (these are the labels which were...

Likely the `matrix-transpose` crate, specifically the `simd-transpose` feature

I'm not sure I follow, can you provide pseudo-code for your suggestion? Are you talking something like a setup factory for ots? ```rust let stream = Stream::new(); let ot_1 =...

It would be worthwhile to estimate the order of magnitude of $N$, but I'm leaning towards just provisioning extra OTs as suggested above. Quick benchmarks on my machine: 100K random...

> did you time just extOT or is it for base OT + ext OT ? @themighty1 base OT + ext OT. The base OT setup time will be constant...

Closing, as this was implemented in #73

> To attack, a malicious Notary would intercept the User's request TLS record, not let it through and somehow force the webserver to respond. Then later when Notary learns the...

Here is the solution I propose to this connection termination problem: We're already planning to scan a server prior to notarization in order to detect which protocol version + ciphersuites...

> I would prefer to not use the word "Note" because it will not be intuitive to the outsiders. We should have a name which we both can use internally...

> it is enough to just stick to notarize Agreed. > how do you mean Claimer != Prover ? I mean that the Prover in the second phase isn't always...