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ShadowRealm Integration

Open legendecas opened this issue 2 years ago • 8 comments

What is the problem this feature will solve?

ShadowRealm is a TC39 stage 3 proposal that introduces a new built-in to provide a distinct global environment, with its own global object containing its own intrinsics and built-ins. Its ability is similar to Node.js built-in vm.Context, however, ShadowRealm provides a stronger guarantee on object exchanges across realm boundaries.

As the ShadowRealm is a distinct global environment, Web integration is also under work (Like 1) to define which web APIs should be exposed in the ShadowRealm so that people can still utilize the Web APIs that still useful in the ShadowRealm. The line generally draw between the APIs that should be exposed in the ShadowRealm or not is generally if the APIs are side-effect-free to the host environment.

What is the feature you are proposing to solve the problem?

ShadowRealm is currently under active development in v8. The design doc of the Host API could be found at here. I'd believe in Node.js we may need to be able to re-evaluate the native modules in the ShadowRealm so that their object graph is not tangled with the main context, to not violate the principle of the design. /cc @nodejs/startup

I'd believe there are a bunch of modules that are useful and can stand in the line of side-effect-free, like EventEmitter, Stream, URL, etc. Also, the Web APIs that are available in Node.js like WebStream could also follow the Web specs to be exposed in the ShadowRealm. We may need to list all the possibilities that can be available in the ShadowRealm, and eventually make them available in the ShadowRealm.

Design Doc: https://docs.google.com/document/d/12_CkX6KbM9kt_lj1pdEgLB8-HQaozkJb7_nwQnHfTTg/edit?usp=sharing

/cc @nodejs/vm

legendecas avatar Mar 30 '22 15:03 legendecas

R.I.P deno

lin72h avatar Mar 31 '22 03:03 lin72h

What sort of guarantees do we get in terms of isolation? Do we have a proven (as in formally) sandbox that is unescapable except with side-channels?

This enables some interesting use cases and I'm wondering if this means we can relax our "Do not use this for security" bits on vm (and build it on top of this)

benjamingr avatar Apr 04 '22 08:04 benjamingr

What sort of guarantees do we get in terms of isolation? Do we have a proven (as in formally) sandbox that is unescapable except with side-channels?

The isolation guarantee of the ShadowRealm is about the isolation of the object graphs. This indicates that we will not accidentally exposes JavaScript vulnerable built-ins to the ShadowRealm, like what vm does:

let ctx = vm.createContext();
let fn = vm.runInContext('...', ctx);

fn({}) // <= the function created in the vm can get access to the OUTER `Object` and hijack its methods

However, since the code evaluated in the ShadowRealm is still sharing the heap with the code outside of the ShadowRealm. This means it is still vulnerable to Spectre, etc.

For Host APIs exposed in the ShadowRealm, technically, we are expecting them to be side-effects free -- and thus can not be utilized to initiate attacks on the host environment.

(@benjamingr I assume you closed the issue accidentally? I'm reopening this)

legendecas avatar Apr 04 '22 09:04 legendecas

(@benjamingr I assume you closed the issue accidentally? I'm reopening this)

Yes, sorry.

benjamingr avatar Apr 04 '22 10:04 benjamingr

However, since the code evaluated in the ShadowRealm is still sharing the heap with the code outside of the ShadowRealm. This means it is still vulnerable to Spectre, etc.

Yeah I think side-channels in general are outside of scope of things like ShadowRealm - even if we run it in a worker (or in a container in a worker that's still not enough to mitigate side channel attacks).

IIRC @erights pointed out there is a way to avoid side-channels: we can choose not to expose APIs (like process.hrtime) that allow time measurement (this also includes stuff like Date.now(), performance.now(), some parts of http and a bunch of others).

benjamingr avatar Apr 04 '22 10:04 benjamingr

IIRC @erights pointed out there is a way to avoid side-channels: we can choose not to expose APIs (like process.hrtime) that allow time measurement (this also includes stuff like Date.now(), performance.now(), some parts of http and a bunch of others).

The SES proposal is designed to deal with all that sort've stuff, ShadowRealm by itself is not a sandbox (however it is usually a neccessary piece of one).

Note that the web is already planning on exposing all sorts of things like high resolution timers into ShadowRealms. It probably wouldn't be a good idea for Node to give the idea that ShadowRealm is itself a sandbox when it explictly won't be a sandbox in other environments.

Jamesernator avatar Apr 15 '22 08:04 Jamesernator

Is this the best issue to discuss what APIs should and shouldn't be exposed in ShadowRealms, or what impact ShadowRealm execution should have on the incubator realm?

In general user code in one realm should avoid being exposed to objects from another realm, when either or both are a ShadowRealm. The obvious case is incubator realm objects leaking into a ShadowRealm, but that also implies shielding user code in the incubator realm from ShadowRealm objects, and being extremely diligent in node internals that may handle a ShadowRealm object (it'd be best avoided if possible).

One thing that comes to mind are all the "global hooks" that node provides. For example, uncaughtException or unhandledRejection events on process, or async_hooks.

mhofman avatar May 02 '22 23:05 mhofman

The obvious case is incubator realm objects leaking into a ShadowRealm, but that also implies shielding user code in the incubator realm from ShadowRealm objects, and being extremely diligent in node internals that may handle a ShadowRealm object (it'd be best avoided if possible).

@mhofman thank you for your ideas! I think this is a very crucial part of the feature too.

One thing that comes to mind are all the "global hooks" that node provides. For example, uncaughtException or unhandledRejection events on process, or async_hooks.

Events like uncaughtException or unhandledRejection are going to abort the process if there are no listeners for them. We can need to wrap the uncaught exception or unhandled rejection and emit them to the main context, and abort the process if there are no listeners.

Or we can route them to an eventemitter that acts as the process object in the main context, in the ShadowRealm. But it may be likely that unhandled exception or rejection can be ignored without anyone noticing them. I don't think it is good for events like uncaughtException or unhandledRejection to be easily ignored. One solution might be first routing the events to the ShadowRealm and if it is not handled, route it to the incubator context again, until it aborts the process. I think this can also be a problem to the Web: https://github.com/whatwg/html/issues/7591.

For async_hooks, as ShadowRealm can schedule it's own promise task and call into the incubator contexts with wrapped function, triggering the hooks with a correct async resource is still crucial to propagate a correct async context for stable APIs like AsyncLocalStorage. For a very primitive thought, I'd find creating wraps for the async resource object and trigger hooks in main context with the wrapped objects (not related to the WrappedFunction or anything, it can be Node.js implementation-defined wraps) can be the most straightforward solution.

legendecas avatar May 04 '22 15:05 legendecas