Matt Luongo
Matt Luongo
Installing the TS binding with such tight version restrictions is a huge pain for downstream devs.
Reward for a signature should grow each block that's missed. If X blocks are missed, we use the next threshold group in line. If we hit the end of the...
The current system incentives punish keeps that withhold data. Naively, if just one node is misbehaving, all nodes are punished. Include details on how to identify and punish aborts per...
Re-organize to describe fundamental attacks and mitigations. - Malicious computation, which is mitigated by zk-proofs - Collusion against confidentiality, mitigated by tattle-tales and canary bounties - Data withholding, mitigated by...
For many early uses (AES, RSA, & ECDSA key material) a few kB is enough, and means secret sharing can happen on chain. It also means much more efficient computation,...
We're avoiding on-chain markets and the number of issues they bring to keep node selection, including Sybil attack vectors. The random beacon will let us fairly match keep providers and...
Detail how keeps enable autonomous use of zk-SNARKs
We'll likely use https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/189.pdf, but MASCOT is also on the table