Registrant transparency for authoritative nameservers and hosting servers

[janwillemstegink]

Alongside the existing tests, I would like to raise a point concerning registrant transparency of nameserver domains.

1. At present, authoritative nameservers for government and critical infrastructure domains may themselves be registered under private or masked registrant data.
2. This undermines accountability and auditability: even if all technical checks (DNSSEC, TLS, etc.) pass, the chain of responsibility for DNS operation remains unclear.
3. Through RDAP integration, it is already technically possible to detect whether a nameserver’s registrant is visible or hidden. I have tools ready to process this data and can link it to WebID-based validation for legally controlled holdership.
4. To be effective, this transparency must be addressed at the national policy level (for example, by the Ministry of the Interior / Internal Affairs). The technical solution exists, but legal and policy recognition are needed to enforce it.

Proposal: Consider adding an advisory check in internet.nl that highlights when authoritative nameservers are registered under private or unverified holder information. This would:

• Increase awareness among public-sector domain owners;
• Encourage alignment with national governance requirements;
• Prepare the ground for NIS2-style accountability obligations.

I emphasize that the technical tooling for validation is ready today—the missing step is the policy framework. Including this as an advisory in internet.nl would be a strong driver for improvement.

And a non-existent province name:

[janwillemstegink]

Regarding TransIP name server domains. Not yet RDAP for .eu. Visibility at .net is more professional.