Haoran

@ljedrz might be of interest to you

On testnet beta, this issue occurs frequently, caused by the UnconfirmedTransaction and UnconfirmedSolution messages. ``` 2024-07-04T10:41:42.069597Z WARN snarkos_node_router::outbound: Failed to send 'UnconfirmedTransaction' to '89.116.29.150:4130': not connected 2024-07-04T10:41:42.069659Z WARN tcp{name="0"}: snarkos_node_tcp::tcp:...

https://github.com/AleoNet/snarkOS/issues/3320 As I observed a few days ago, I thought this issue can be ignored because the team did not comment on it. Now I reopened this issue

The BFT module also has the same problem: https://github.com/AleoNet/snarkOS/blob/cd73c74e6da6d65ed2457b5dc58b693dcb6ce5a6/node/bft/src/gateway.rs#L1262-L1282

I checked the source code and found that the limit is only checked for actively connected peers, not for passively connected peers. This should not be able to limit spam...

> Sounds good @niklaslong > > @elderhammer unfortunately without demonstration that 1-2 attackers can actually fully DoS a validator, this is not a valid P1/P2, but I can imagine a...

> In other words: my understanding is P1/P2 rewards are reserved if a single attacker would be able to bring down a validator. But given that validators have a hardcoded...

Yes, I also think it should be up to the node operator to handle this by limiting network connections as appropriate. So, should I close this issue now? @ljedrz