dankrad

I think we should add withdrawal key exits (#1578) in phase 1. It is essential for staking operations. It was ok to skip for phase 0 but will be a...

> * **Establish and maintain a formal invariant bounding validator rewards**, specifically that if validators are behaving perfectly, the per-epoch total reward rate equals `BASE_REWARD_FACTOR / sqrt(total_deposits)`. This is true...

It's an interesting idea to attach range assumptions to each variable that have to be checked, and then clients can hopefully drop most of these checks by proving from other...

> Attempting some clarification here. In addition to long-term average cost basis, there are _two_ extra rules which need implementing, rather than just one: > > 1. Disposal and reacquisition...

> There is another constant `TARGET_BLOB_GAS_PER_BLOCK` that is explicitly set by the EIP, do we want to turn this constant to be a half of the max value (computable on...

An alternative that may be more elegant and lets us remove some fields from the header: Only add the current blob gas price (to both execution header and the execution...

I think this would need some clarification. I'm happy to create a PR of what's needed in my opinion.

> This is unsafe due to the same reasons it's unsafe to sync from outside of the WS period. Well, I argue it's not unsafe because there are no safety...

> To try and address the second, I suggest we consider gossiping fraud proofs (while this won't prevent rollbacks, it will at least allow clients to be aware that the...

(Note that for shard chains, this will not be a problem -- since we are constructing them to be stateless, the shard block itself is already a suitable fraud proof)....