SovereignCloudStack
[Other] Setup productive SCS cluster at Cloud&Heat with Yaook on bare metal as FITKO PoC
Provide a productive SCS cluster as PoC for FITKO. The cluster MUST be set up with the open source Lifecycle Management Tool for OpenStack and K8S Yaook and must be SCS compliant.
In contrast to #414, productive SCS cluster is set up on bare metal.
(Note: we initially used #414 as the sole issue to track both the provisioning of the virtual and the bare metal test clusters. For the sake of better documentation, we retroactively created this separate issue for the bare metal setup.)
Current state is that the installation is completed and we have a working bare metal Yaook cluster. Thanks to the contributions of @cah-hbaum this OpenStack cluster is already SCS compliant, i.e., it fulfills the stabilized standards of the IaaS track (details can be found in #415 and in https://github.com/SovereignCloudStack/standards/tree/do-not-merge/scs-compliant-yaook/Informational). Here's a recap of what happened until we got to this point:
Initial preparation for the Yaook bare metal installation started at the beginning of March. This involved a "rehearsal" of the installation procedure on an existing, simpler test cluster, because for me this was the first time conducting such an install and the hardware for the actual installation was not yet commisioned.
During the rehearsal we already had network setup issues we needed to work around:
- The first issues were related to VLAN tagging and caused connection issues between the Yaook Management Cluster and the install node. These were (probably) caused by some incompatibilities or misconfiguration of the network interfaces of the virtual install node and/or KVM (Proxmox). The exact cause is not known, because we gave up debugging at some point and switched to a bare metal install node, which immediately worked.
- The second set of issues were related to PXE booting for the actual nodes that are supposed to be provisioned by ironic. These turned out to be firmware issues (a subset of the servers "forgot" its PXE configuration after reboot) as well as misleading and very well hidden BIOS settings (especially: PXE boot timeouts).
The installation of the bare metal test cluster was conducted between March 11th and March 19th but we again bumped into a lot of technical difficulties. Debugging and fixing these was a bit more time consuming than usual because I am not yet 100% accustomed to the interactions of all the components.
- Because this is going to be a productive cluster, the network setup is a lot more complex than the rehearsal install (more redundancy, stricter isolation). In addition to separate VLANs and subnets for different purposes, we also use several dedicated switches (e.g., for the Ceph nodes). This took several iterations and debugging sessions to get everything right, i.e., that all components supposed to be communicating could talk to each other.
- Some trial and error was needed to get the netplan part of the cloud-init configuration right, also partly because I misunderstood the configuration. (This is very unfortunate and we will make this more robust and easier to verify in the future, e.g., by switching to interface selection by MAC address via the
matchkeyword.) - During provisioning with ironic, a subset of the nodes repeatedly ended up in the
clean failedstate. It took some time to debug, but the Yaook bare metal logs contained the hint ("certificate not yet valid") and we finally figured out this was caused by an extremely out of sync hardware clock. - A similar, firmware setup/BIOS related error that cost us time was a still active hardware raid configuration on another subset of the nodes, which also lead to provisioning failures with ironic.
- Finally, we had to troubleshoot some software issues that worked flawlessly before: e.g., during the automated install we ran into the problem that the K8s APT repositories were moved. Additionally, the CNI plugin (calico) installation failed initially, which we just fixed by switching to a different release.
The next step will involve moving the hardware from our facility to its final location.
@cah-hbaum Please provide YAML output for SCS compatible IaaS v4, to proof cluster is SCS compliant.
The next step will involve moving the hardware from our facility to its final location.
Status update:
- Hardware was successfully moved to the final location (I am unsure if I am allowed to reveal the location yet – please be patient, more infos will come soon) and the cluster is stable.
- The next step is a proper network link, we currently use a temporary link.
Status update for multiple working days:
- Uplink configured
- Providernet (1000) configured on computes and controllers
- Network, Subnet, Router configured in OpenStack
- Firewalls configured for routing
- tested "Ubuntu 22.04" VM with public-routable IP
- Configured and used SCS conformity-tests on cluster
Status update:
- configured openStack API and made it publicly available
- configured monitoring on site-wide cluster and connected it to c&h global monitoring
- started installing yk8s for functionality-proof
- benchmarked VM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benchmark Run: Thu May 02 2024 07:01:31 - 07:29:25
8 CPUs in system; running 1 parallel copy of tests
Dhrystone 2 using register variables 49374945.7 lps (10.0 s, 7 samples)
Double-Precision Whetstone 7331.2 MWIPS (8.8 s, 7 samples)
Execl Throughput 4367.4 lps (29.7 s, 2 samples)
File Copy 1024 bufsize 2000 maxblocks 1700297.0 KBps (30.0 s, 2 samples)
File Copy 256 bufsize 500 maxblocks 465706.0 KBps (30.0 s, 2 samples)
File Copy 4096 bufsize 8000 maxblocks 4516692.6 KBps (30.0 s, 2 samples)
Pipe Throughput 2643777.7 lps (10.0 s, 7 samples)
Pipe-based Context Switching 249035.2 lps (10.0 s, 7 samples)
Process Creation 4239.2 lps (30.0 s, 2 samples)
Shell Scripts (1 concurrent) 3404.9 lpm (60.0 s, 2 samples)
Shell Scripts (8 concurrent) 7774.8 lpm (60.0 s, 2 samples)
System Call Overhead 2399837.6 lps (10.0 s, 7 samples)
System Benchmarks Index Values BASELINE RESULT INDEX
Dhrystone 2 using register variables 116700.0 49374945.7 4230.9
Double-Precision Whetstone 55.0 7331.2 1333.0
Execl Throughput 43.0 4367.4 1015.7
File Copy 1024 bufsize 2000 maxblocks 3960.0 1700297.0 4293.7
File Copy 256 bufsize 500 maxblocks 1655.0 465706.0 2813.9
File Copy 4096 bufsize 8000 maxblocks 5800.0 4516692.6 7787.4
Pipe Throughput 12440.0 2643777.7 2125.2
Pipe-based Context Switching 4000.0 249035.2 622.6
Process Creation 126.0 4239.2 336.4
Shell Scripts (1 concurrent) 42.4 3404.9 803.0
Shell Scripts (8 concurrent) 6.0 7774.8 12958.0
System Call Overhead 15000.0 2399837.6 1599.9
========
System Benchmarks Index Score 1995.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benchmark Run: Thu May 02 2024 07:29:25 - 07:57:36
8 CPUs in system; running 8 parallel copies of tests
Dhrystone 2 using register variables 396360992.9 lps (10.0 s, 7 samples)
Double-Precision Whetstone 58344.0 MWIPS (9.8 s, 7 samples)
Execl Throughput 20889.7 lps (29.9 s, 2 samples)
File Copy 1024 bufsize 2000 maxblocks 12927118.6 KBps (30.0 s, 2 samples)
File Copy 256 bufsize 500 maxblocks 3677514.2 KBps (30.0 s, 2 samples)
File Copy 4096 bufsize 8000 maxblocks 22497528.7 KBps (30.0 s, 2 samples)
Pipe Throughput 21037325.6 lps (10.0 s, 7 samples)
Pipe-based Context Switching 1958050.1 lps (10.0 s, 7 samples)
Process Creation 44864.0 lps (30.0 s, 2 samples)
Shell Scripts (1 concurrent) 65052.2 lpm (60.0 s, 2 samples)
Shell Scripts (8 concurrent) 9420.2 lpm (60.0 s, 2 samples)
System Call Overhead 19695065.7 lps (10.0 s, 7 samples)
System Benchmarks Index Values BASELINE RESULT INDEX
Dhrystone 2 using register variables 116700.0 396360992.9 33964.1
Double-Precision Whetstone 55.0 58344.0 10608.0
Execl Throughput 43.0 20889.7 4858.1
File Copy 1024 bufsize 2000 maxblocks 3960.0 12927118.6 32644.2
File Copy 256 bufsize 500 maxblocks 1655.0 3677514.2 22220.6
File Copy 4096 bufsize 8000 maxblocks 5800.0 22497528.7 38788.8
Pipe Throughput 12440.0 21037325.6 16911.0
Pipe-based Context Switching 4000.0 1958050.1 4895.1
Process Creation 126.0 44864.0 3560.6
Shell Scripts (1 concurrent) 42.4 65052.2 15342.5
Shell Scripts (8 concurrent) 6.0 9420.2 15700.3
System Call Overhead 15000.0 19695065.7 13130.0
========
System Benchmarks Index Score 13756.0
@shmelkin Can you please share how you benchmarked the VM? I would like to add this to the docs as a sample for a benchmark. We only documented fio at the moment.
- issued LetsEncrypt certificates for public openstack api endpoints
- debugging network issue with OVN in the cluster, see post from @horazont for more info
- fixed image-parameter minRam for all scs-compliant images
- did tempest tests for the cluster (WIP)
Okay, this is interesting. Basically it's a "regression" from the OVS setups we are used to.
In OpenvSwitch/L3-Agent based setups, the NAT rules for ingress (and I suppose also egress) traffic for floating IPs were set up no matter whether the port to which the floating IP was bound was ACTIVE or DOWN.
In OVN, the NAT rules are only set up when the port is up.
That breaks a specific use case, which is the use of VRRP/keepalived in VMs to implement custom load balancers or other HA solutions.
(In particular, this breaks yaook/k8s which we tried to run as a "burn in" test.)
I'll bring this up in next week's IaaS call.
- Installed healthmonitor on l1.cloudandheat.com https://health.l1.cloudandheat.sovereignit.cloud:3000/
- created credentials/projects for SCS members so that they can prepare scs-summit providerexchange
- further investigated OVN NAT topic (no solution yet...)
- Finished rollout of yk8s as burn-in test
We looked more into the OVN issue and it seems the only viable workaround is using allowed-address on the non VRRP port. This is somewhat sad, we'll discuss it in the IaaS call tomorrow.
In osism/terraform-base (used by osism/testbed) we do it this way (allowed-address) as well (VRRP is only used inside the virtual network and the managed VIP is only accessed from inside the same virtual network):
- security group rule to allow protocol 112: https://github.com/osism/terraform-base/blob/ac9eb008deffc74f08b2f7070b2f7526852c7fef/testbed-default/neutron.tf#L85-L91
- allowed address pairs on the ports: https://github.com/osism/terraform-base/blob/main/testbed-default/nodes.tf#L15-L21
We do not reserve the VIPs by creating unassigned Neutron ports because we work with static IP addresses in osism/terraform-base. This is therefore not necessary.
It also looks as if this has always been the way independent of OVN. At least https://www.codecentric.de/wissens-hub/blog/highly-available-vips-openstack-vms-vrrp comes from a time when IMO there was no OVN in OpenStack (or OVN itself?).
Searched for some more references:
- https://access.redhat.com/documentation/de-de/red_hat_openstack_platform/13/html/networking_guide/config-allowed-address-pairs_rhosp-network (Also quite old and IMO before OVN)
- https://docs.openstack.org/neutron/latest/admin/archives/introduction.html#allowed-address-pairs (VRRP is mentioned there: "This enables the use of protocols such as VRRP, which floats an IP address between two instances to enable fast data plane failover."
I think @berendt is right, if this would work without allowed_address_pairs you would have a security issue I think.
By default strict filters only allow the configured subnets and associated macs to pass. Via allowed_address_pairs you are given an allowlist to extend this where needed, e.g. for VRRP.
If it would work the other way around arbitrary L2 or L3 traffic would be allowed to flow, which is of course insecure?
Summary of working day:
- prepared renaming of api endpoints
- tested using multiple fqdn's via ingress redirect (not successfull, yet)
- tested using multiple ingresses to serve the same endpoint (not successfull, yet)
- installed horizon dashboard (horizon.l1.cloudandheat.com, temporary name)
- removing of error-ish and stuck volumes
Summary of multiple working days:
- performed maintenance (deletion of stuck volumes) x2
- renamed API for horizon
- rolled out users for maintenance on firewalls, ymc, installnode and all controllers, computes, and storages (for C&H Rufbereitschaft) to make support for SCS Summit possible
- looked into issue that cinder volumes get stuck constantly (ongoing...)
We will upgrade the deployment to the current release of yaook and kubernetes 1.27.10 to probably solve the cinder issue and provide a up-to-date-ish version.
Today, I started by preparing necessary artifacts (WIP)
- mgmt-cluster repository and manifests
- netplan configuration for different parts of the infrastructure
- bare-metal-k8s repository and manifests
- ch-lbaas
- netbox backup
We also need to backup/snapshot the healthmonitor, which will be tested later today and done right before the upgrade.
I will document here further
As outlined in the last comment, the deployment was upgraded to the current release of Yaook in an effort to solve the Cinder issues.
Right now, the health monitor VM isn't running anymore and we're in the progress of restoring its operation (this means, the links and the badges in the README currently don't work or show the compliance test as failed).
After a whole lot of trouble, the deployment is ready and functional. We
- updated to 1.27.10 k8s and OpenStack Zed with yaook
- issues with ceph rollout via yaook lcm were resolved
- issues with cinder communication with ceph were resolved
- issues with glance communication with ceph were resolved
- networking was fixed (pxe)
- updated to 1.27.10 k8s and OpenStack Zed with yaook
How do we deal with this? From SCS's point of view, we require OpenStack 2023.2 as the minimum version for OpenStack and not Zed.
- updated to 1.27.10 k8s and OpenStack Zed with yaook
How do we deal with this? From SCS's point of view, we require OpenStack 2023.2 as the minimum version for OpenStack and not Zed.
Oh really? Where exactly is that mentioned, I couldn't find that during my quick search.
@berendt in regards to the OpenStack version there is nothing (to my knowledge) currently in the standards. We require the OpenStack powered compute 2022.11 alongside the standards referenced here: https://docs.scs.community/standards/scs-compatible-iaas
Is there any functional reason that Zed (as in this case) would not be sufficient?
So why do we put ourselves under the burden of going through every upgrade in the reference implementation if it is not necessary? I had actually already assumed that we want to demand very up-to-date Openstack (and also Ceph and Kubernetes)? We also require the CSPs to have upgraded within 1 month. So that wouldn't be necessary?
The discussion for the update-window of the reference implementation is (imho) not directly connected, since that discussion is about providing support, security-updates etc. for the reference implementation. If there is no functional reason and our conformance tests succeed (as well as the openstack powered compute 2022.11) and as such the established standards are complied with, I see no reason to require a specific OpenStack version. Especially not if we require that certain APIs are fulfilled - since that basically allows a compatibility on the API-level (and would even allow an API-wrapper if it behaves correctly). Am I overlooking something?
Having an up-to-date reference implementation is worth pursuing outside of pure standard conformance, imho.
Update for multiple working days:
- Health monitor is up and running and can be accessed via GitHub auth again
- Issued new credentials for the compliance tests in GitHub and Zuul (#608)
- Cinder issues have been resolved with the upgrade and the IaaS compliance tests run successfully (and including IaaS scope v4 this time :tada:)
- Fixed a monitoring issue with prometheus caused by insufficient pod resource limits leading to OOMKilled crashloop
- Looked into Ceph performance issues, but found no obvious mistakes or "low-hanging fruits" (issues can be seen "Resource wait" times in the OSHM)
Today I noticed, via the health monitor, that the apimon loop couldn't create volumes anymore. apimon logs showed that the volume quota was exceeded. Usually, APImon performs cleanup of old volumes, but it always failed with:
volume status must be available or error or error_restoring or error_extending or error_managing and must not be migrating, attached, belong to a group, have snapshots, awaiting a transfer, or be disassociated from snapshots after volume transfer
This was caused by dangling volumes which were still shown as attaching, attached or in-use, although openstack server list didn't show any running APIMonitor instances anymore. These, in turn, seem to appear because instance creation fails with errors like:
Build of instance 68d71a43-e26e-4b34-8d93-37d5b29ab6bb aborted: Unable to update the attachment. (HTTP 500)
which – I think – leaves the Cinder database in an inconsistent state.
I stopped the apimon temporarily. Using cinder reset-state --state available --attach-status detached VOLUME_UUID for the respective volumes, I was able to reset the volume states so they could be deleted. I am now looking into the HTTP 500 "Unable to update the attachment" error.
I can only reproduce this with the load generated by the apimon. Volume operations do not always, but quite reliably fail. Based on my findings there is something going on with the message queue.
In the cinder API logs, I see timeouts waiting for a reply for an operation, such as attachment_update. The volume manager says it couldn't send a reply because the queue was gone in the meantime. (Maybe the whole operation is just too slow and some kind of garbage collection for the queue kicks in too early?)
Here is an relevant example snippet from the cinder volume manager logs:
...
2024-06-11 14:12:49 INFO cinder.volume.manager Created volume successfully.
2024-06-11 14:12:51 INFO cinder.volume.manager attachment_update completed successfully.
2024-06-11 14:12:51 INFO cinder.volume.manager attachment_update completed successfully.
2024-06-11 14:12:51 INFO cinder.volume.manager attachment_update completed successfully.
2024-06-11 14:12:51 INFO cinder.volume.manager attachment_update completed successfully.
2024-06-11 14:13:51 WARNING oslo_messaging._drivers.amqpdriver reply_3a06eb20db5d46318534af475f7c46c5 doesn't exist, drop reply to 1ffd3e1fb22d4007bc6b16c5d784f430
2024-06-11 14:13:51 ERROR oslo_messaging._drivers.amqpdriver The reply 1ffd3e1fb22d4007bc6b16c5d784f430 failed to send after 60 seconds due to a missing queue (reply_3a06eb20db5d46318534af475f7c46c5). Abandoning...
2024-06-11 14:13:51 INFO cinder.volume.manager Terminate volume connection completed successfully.
2024-06-11 14:13:51 WARNING oslo_messaging._drivers.amqpdriver reply_3a06eb20db5d46318534af475f7c46c5 doesn't exist, drop reply to 73b1e4390fd74484ab8cbfbb7e376ad2
...
And the matching ERROR with the same message ID 1ffd3e1fb22d4007bc6b16c5d784f430 from the cinder API logs:
...
cinder-api-6494ffc69b-7jcwm: 2024-06-11 14:13:50 ERROR cinder.api.v3.attachments Unable to update the attachment.
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/oslo_messaging/_drivers/amqpdriver.py", line 441, in get
return self._queues[msg_id].get(block=True, timeout=timeout)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/eventlet/queue.py", line 322, in get
return waiter.wait()
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/eventlet/queue.py", line 141, in wait
return get_hub().switch()
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/eventlet/hubs/hub.py", line 313, in switch
return self.greenlet.switch()
_queue.Empty
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/cinder/api/v3/attachments.py", line 250, in update
self.volume_api.attachment_update(context,
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/decorator.py", line 232, in fun
return caller(func, *(extras + args), **kw)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/cinder/coordination.py", line 200, in _synchronized
return f(*a, **k)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/cinder/volume/api.py", line 2535, in attachment_update
self.volume_rpcapi.attachment_update(ctxt,
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/cinder/rpc.py", line 200, in _wrapper
return f(self, *args, **kwargs)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/cinder/volume/rpcapi.py", line 479, in attachment_update
return cctxt.call(ctxt,
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/oslo_messaging/rpc/client.py", line 189, in call
result = self.transport._send(
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/oslo_messaging/transport.py", line 123, in _send
return self._driver.send(target, ctxt, message,
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/oslo_messaging/_drivers/amqpdriver.py", line 689, in send
return self._send(target, ctxt, message, wait_for_reply, timeout,
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/oslo_messaging/_drivers/amqpdriver.py", line 678, in _send
result = self._waiter.wait(msg_id, timeout,
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/oslo_messaging/_drivers/amqpdriver.py", line 567, in wait
message = self.waiters.get(msg_id, timeout=timeout)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/oslo_messaging/_drivers/amqpdriver.py", line 443, in get
raise oslo_messaging.MessagingTimeout(
oslo_messaging.exceptions.MessagingTimeout: Timed out waiting for a reply to message ID 1ffd3e1fb22d4007bc6b16c5d784f430
cinder-api-6494ffc69b-7jcwm: 2024-06-11 14:13:50 INFO cinder.api.openstack.wsgi HTTP exception thrown: Unable to update the attachment.
cinder-api-6494ffc69b-7jcwm: 2024-06-11 14:13:50 INFO cinder.api.openstack.wsgi https://cinder-api.yaook.svc:8776/v3/2fc014a6dd014c0bb3b53494a5b86fa9/attachme
nts/a788db16-75b0-46e8-b407-e7415b455427 returned with HTTP 500
cinder-api-6494ffc69b-7jcwm: 2024-06-11 14:13:50 INFO eventlet.wsgi.server 10.2.1.10,127.0.0.1 "PUT /v3/2fc014a6dd014c0bb3b53494a5b86fa9/attachments/a788db16-
75b0-46e8-b407-e7415b455427 HTTP/1.1" status: 500 len: 400 time: 60.0660729
...
Summary for multiple working days:
- Investigated the volume attachment troubles and did a cleanup of the leaked volumes from time to time.
- Sanity checked ceph cluster health again -> everything happy.
- Sanity checked the cinder RabbitMQ with
rabbitmqctl cluster_healthand with rabbitmq-check.py from the yaook debugbox -> everything happy. - Switched to raw Debian 12 image for the apimon tests as suggested by Kurt, this helped speeding up the volume creation a lot.
- Cross-checked/compared cinder and rabbitMQ configuration with other working deployments -> nothing suspicious.
- Read through
oslo_messagingandcindersources to grasp how queues are created -> culprit found, it's a caching issue.- Previously, I assumed reply queues for RPC calls are always created on the fly according to the RPC reference from the nova docs: "Every consumer connects to a unique direct-based exchange via a unique exclusive queue; its life-cycle is limited to the message delivery; the exchange and queue identifiers are determined by a UUID generator".
- However, this is not exactly true:
oslo_messaginglibrary creates reply queues with a random name on first use and caches the reply queue name in theRabbitDriver/AMQPDriverBaseobject, to avoid creating too many queues (see method_get_reply_q()in amqpdriver.py). So basically, there is a cached reply queue name for every cinder API worker (green)thread. - There is no code in cinder/oslo_messaging that ensures that the corresponding cached queue still exists.
- side note: I also suspect there is no check if the queue was physically created and replicated to all rabbitmq replicas in the first place (and I reckon this would be hard to do, if performance matters).
- During the weekly certificate rotation conducted by the Yaook operator, rabbitmq is reloaded/restarted to pick up the new certs. During this time, some of the reply queues get dropped but cinder API tries to use them anyways and fails.
- e.g.,
[error] <0.27146.0> operation queue.declare caused a channel exception not_found: queue 'reply_ed3fbf13f2e7488c9cbd19f0ad13588d' in vhost '/' process is stopped by supervisor - observed problems with volume attachments start exactly at that point
- e.g.,
- Ultimately, a simple restart of the cinder-api processes helps (in yaook terms, a rolling restart of the cinder-api deployment) -> of course that's not a long term solution.
- The last spike of resource errors in the health monitor was caused again by this issue, because cert rotation was yesterday night.
- Other services that use RPC calls can be affected by this as well, such as
nova-scheduler,nova-conductorand so on.
Update for the last few days:
- Rolled out fixes for "RegreSSHion" vulnerability in openssh-server on cluster infra and oshm-driver instance (which hosts the health monitor).
- Rolled out fixes for OSSA-2024-001 aka CVE-2024-32498 (see Yaook Security Advisory). We used the
YAOOK_OP_VERSIONS_OVERRIDEapproach to roll out the patched images for nova, nova-compute, cinder and glance without having to wait for the release of new Yaook Operator Helm Charts. - Fixed volume attachment quirk ("attached on None") of the oshm-driver instance.
- Removed leaked volumes and restarted cinder-api again after the last cert rotation.
- Further investigated a long term fix for the occassional volume attachment issue caused by stopped RabbitMQ queues:
- There are different types of RabbitMQ queues, such as classic and quorum. For HA clusters, the vendor recommends quorum queues. Classic queues are deprecated and known to cause troubles during restarts, e.g., see discussions here, here, here and here.
- Yaook, by default, configures OpenStack components to use quorum queues via the
rabbit_quorum_queue=truesetting in the[oslo_messaging_rabbit]section. - However, checking with
rabbitmqctl list_queues name type statereveals that for the reply queues and some others, classic queues are still used. (It appears these are the transient queues.) - In
oslo.messaging, there are some semi recent changes related to this:- https://github.com/openstack/oslo.messaging/commit/989dbb8aad8be68a9c63e2e6a4d445cc445c051c – Add a new flag
rabbit_transient_quorum_queueto enable the use of quorum for transient queues (reply_and_fanout_) - https://github.com/openstack/oslo.messaging/commit/8e3c523fd74257a78ceb384063f81db2e92a2ebd – Auto-delete the failed quorum rabbit queues
- (last one won't help us here)
- https://github.com/openstack/oslo.messaging/commit/989dbb8aad8be68a9c63e2e6a4d445cc445c051c – Add a new flag
- I am about to evaluate these settings in our virtualized Yaook setup, but I had to upgrade that to Zed first.
- Note there is, to my knowledge, no other way to force RabbitMQ to only use quorum queues (e.g., via policy).
- There are some other tuning knobs which I am currently evaluating, especially worker counts in the affected services. It turns out, that basically all services, except glance, use the CPU count as the default.
Update wrt RabbitMQ / volume service issues:
rabbit_transient_quorum_queuecan't be used, this setting is too new :(- Thanks to a coworker, we found another oslo.messaging setting worth tweaking:
heartbeat_rate-> in Zed, default is 2, recommended is 3 (see https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/oslo.messaging/+/875615) - In addition to that, I assembled all necessary settings for sensible worker counts in OpenStack services and carefully tested all of that in our virtualized SCS Yaook cluster.
- I rolled out the corresponding changes in the productive cluster (nova, neutron, glance, cinder, barbican). Because Nova, Neutron and Cinder APIs were restarting, there was a very short interruption which can be seen in the Health Monitor, but everything is okay now again.
- We will see on Monday, if these measures helped (remember: certificate rotation + RabbitMQ rolling restart is Sunday night).
Update:
- Our APImon now uses a dedicated OpenStack project, i.e., not the same project where the oshm-driver instance is running. Because we need to cleanup leaked volume leftovers from time to time, this separation makes sense.
- The oslo.messaging config and worker number changes from my last comment didn't help, unfortunately. The RabbitMQ reply queue issues that appear after regular certificate rotation + rolling restart remain. But, as I've written above, at least we know when it's happening and what can be done to restore service.