msr-safe
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LLNL
Allows safer access to model specific registers (MSRs)
This should make Stephanie and myself the default reviewers. Fixes #124
The suggested reviewer list is effectively anyone who has interacted with this project. Setting up a CODEOWNERS file should set default reviewers.
The only other place the feature check is used is during boot. I can imagine a worlds where a subset of cores do not have MSR capabilities. If that CPU...
This is another holdover from the stock msr kernel module. To the best of my knowledge, if this code is ever reached, the test can't fail. No need to keep...
This was copy/paste code from the msr_safe device that's not useful for the batch device. The `X86_FEATURE_MSR` is only used in two places in the kernel source: msr.c and `arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h`....
Similar to #117 `msr_open()` in `msr_batch.c` assumes the minor device number is a cpu and checks if msrs are supported on that cpu. This has been working inadvertently until now....
This code: ``` static int msrbatch_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { unsigned int cpu; struct cpuinfo_x86 *c; cpu = iminor(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode); if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids || !cpu_online(cpu)) { pr_debug("cpu #%u...
Should be a one-line change.
CAP_SYS_RAWIO checks are another holdover from backwards compatibility with the stock msr kernel module. Absent that rationale, allowing "someone who isn't quite root"[1] to have unfettered access to all MSRs...