Valere Fedronic
Valere Fedronic
Looks like we have to manually release some FFIObjects 
Following the work on invisible crypto it is now possible to exclude devices not signed by their owner from participating in encrypted room: - When encrypting via [CollectStrategy/IdentityBased](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/blob/c7708d6154f2c56165494280e4c14cfdf7226a53/crates/matrix-sdk-crypto/src/session_manager/group_sessions/share_strategy.rs#L40C10-L40C25) - When...
Currently if a redacted event is passed to `OlmMachine::decrypt_room_event` it will fail with error `UnsupportedAlgorithm`(?). Given that the event is redacted, there won't be an `algorithm`field, so it's expected. Nonetheless...
Quick change to expose `has_verification_violation` in the crypto ffi layer for legacy mobile apps. - [ ] Public API changes documented in changelogs (optional) Signed-off-by:
## Context Currently we detect 2 different things for identity changes ( for simplicity, consider here only OtherUserIdentity): - (Pinning Violation) The first time an identity is seen we remember...
There is a pitfall with `Device` and `set_local_trust`. If you keep a Device object around for some time then later on do a `set_local_trust` it is doing a full `DeviceChanges`...
Scenario: A caller keeps a `UserIdentity` (I) in memory for some time; meanwhile a `keys_query` response updates the identity to (I') with new cross-signing keys. A call to [pin](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/blob/4d45b02e916df490b506ab33f49f85fa14d9b7dd/crates/matrix-sdk/src/encryption/identities/users.rs#L439) on...
Part of https://github.com/element-hq/crypto-internal/issues/308. Modify TimelineEvent to expose New Megolm errors when TrustRequirement is CrossSigning*, add new cases to UtdCause. See https://github.com/element-hq/crypto-internal/issues/353 for the new error to show in timeline
When we receive a Megolm key (session) with a particular session ID from somewhere, we need to store it into the local store. The key is flagged with `imported` if...
Part of https://github.com/element-hq/element-meta/issues/764. Establish a TOFU-style mechanism where users' signing keys are pinned when they're first encountered; internally, this will look similar to user verification, but will require no action...