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what does webtunnel do for tls-in-tls, and novelty

Open mmmray opened this issue 1 year ago • 8 comments

I am reading through #263 and https://www.usenix.org/system/files/foci20-paper-frolov.pdf, and come across quotes like this:

"While HTTPT is not the final word in the censorship arms race, we believe it presents a unique new challenge for censor"

is it really though? there's a year-long precedent for tcp/ip-in-websocket-in-https, and avid readers of this forum or the xtls bugtracker are most certainly aware that countermeasures have already been deployed. Prior art is not at all mentioned or cited in the paper, and the discussion in the above linked ticket that RPRX started went nowhere. Meanwhile it's acknowledged that the just-deployed webtunnel protocol in Tor is already defeated in Iran.

I hope this isn't too harsh, but I find this baffling. I can understand that Tor is very popular and therefore a massive target for censors, and so I do not expect Tor to constantly be on the forefront of censorship circumvention. But it seems to me there is either a process, an iteration-speed or communication problem when years-old approaches are being presented as novel, and the deployment of a new kind of obfuscation protocol is dead-at-birth in Iran.

It reminds me of discussions in https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/136#issuecomment-1279682104 because it seems to me that the way new things are being deployed in Tor is very much working within the academic framework, against a censor that has employed market forces long ago.

mmmray avatar Mar 13 '24 15:03 mmmray

i wanted to know more about this too. i was really hoping that this could have been used to make a more robust proxy to talk to my friends/family over signal but this seems like it won't work either for long.

but of course, i am not very knowledgable in protocols and circumvention and hopefully it will be built upon soon

raberto-nowhere avatar Mar 14 '24 01:03 raberto-nowhere

As we tested in the last 24 hours, Webtunnel is blocked by default in most of Iran's ISPs. Years ago, v2ray/xray has been doing this since then, and they are partially blocked. Now, Tor has been updated to a method that is already blocked in Iran! (if not blocked, extremely high jitter or limited UL speed)

irgfw avatar Mar 14 '24 13:03 irgfw

You didn't need to test. It has been specifically noted that WebTunnel doesn't work in Iran. This information can be found in the Tor Project's blog:

However, while WebTunnel works in regions like China and Russia, it does not currently work in some regions in Iran.

https://blog.torproject.org/introducing-webtunnel-evading-censorship-by-hiding-in-plain-sight/

For Tor users in Iran looking for alternative methods, they can use Snowflake: https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-combined.html?start=2023-12-15&end=2024-03-14&country=ir

gusgustavo avatar Mar 14 '24 13:03 gusgustavo

I'm under the impression that WebTunnel, or let's say HTTPT (FOCI 2020), is specifically designed to address the unique challenge of circumvention servers CAN BE actively probed by censors (Detecting Probe-resistant Proxies, NDSS 2020). In section 3 of the paper, you may see many interesting designs adopted by later implementations such as shadow-tls.

So I do see the novelties in terms of implementing active probing resistance, but as you mentioned the design does not include any effort in traffic shaping, which is proved to be a major vulnerability at a later time. It might be more proper to compare HTTPT to plain designs like Shadowsocks and Trojan. Apparently it is not as complex as *Ray designs which introduced multiple factors of complexity and did a better job in the context of against real-world censors.

gaukas avatar Mar 18 '24 00:03 gaukas

Actually I am curious, do we have more information on "why" would WebTunnel not work in Iran?

gaukas avatar Mar 18 '24 19:03 gaukas

In section 3 of the paper, you may see many interesting designs adopted by later implementations such as shadow-tls.

I'm not entirely sure, but I believe the websocket implementation in v2ray is older than 2020. I'm not entirely sure if the path variable was there from the start, which would be the last missing piece for active probing resistance in the original v2ray from my understanding. I'm not sure about the deployment of uTLS at that time though, it's likely that HTTPT was at the forefront with regard to client tls fingerprinting.

mmmray avatar Mar 21 '24 15:03 mmmray

Actually I am curious, do we have more information on "why" would WebTunnel not work in Iran?

Well, it works. Just tested several from Zi-Tel ISP. Possible issues with webtunnels:

  • Many of them are hosted on Cloudflare. It could be that some of the hosters forget to disable bot detection for the proxy URL and webtunnel face http challenge page.
  • Webtunnel doesn't seem to work with proxy
  • Webtunnel have single (and may be unique) TLS fingerprint

ValdikSS avatar Mar 22 '24 19:03 ValdikSS

Webtunnel have single (and may be unique) TLS fingerprint

uTLS for everyone! 🥂

gaukas avatar Mar 22 '24 21:03 gaukas